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PROFESSOR GRZYBOWSKI: My name is Grzybowski. I am associated with Duke
Law School, and I am a specialist in Soviet international law. I have one question
for Ambassador Koh.
Is it not true that it was the Soviet Union which first rejected the Convention?
On the 18th of March, twelve days before the closing of the Convention, the Gov-
ernment of the Soviet Union enacted a decree in which it established an agency for
deep sea mining and at the same time declared its total disapproval of the deep sea
mining provisions of the Convention, which, in view of the fact that the Conven-
tion did not permit reservations to the Convention, amounted to the total rejection
of the Convention. And that also meant that not only the Soviet Union but the
entire Soviet Bloc rejected it.
Now the other question is, that although the main blame for the nonsuccess of
the Convention is laid at the door of the United States, in fact, over 20 states have
objected to it. And here we have a ridiculous situation because the West and the
Soviet Bloc have adopted the same attitude towards a Convention, which happens
very seldom.
AMBASSADOR KOH: Some of the facts stated are correct, but some of the facts are
not correct, so if I may first state which of the facts are correct.
It is true that during the final session of the Conference, the Presidium of the
Soviet Union enacted what, in effect, is unilateral national legislation on seabed
mining. For this, naturally, they were subject to the criticism of the Group of 77,
which had previously criticized the same behavior on the part of the United
States, of the British, of West Germany, and of the French.
Why the Soviet Union chose that particular moment to act, I do not know. It
seems to me the timing was very clumsy-extremely clumsy. The Soviet Union
had been enjoying for many years the confrontation between the West and the
developing countries. Why did they find it necessary at the last moment in the life
of the Conference to join the West? I cannot understand, but then few of us can
understand how the leaders of the Kremlin think.
But we should not be too critical about the misconduct of the Soviet Union,
since the U.S. Government acted in the same manner two years earlier. In fact, if
you look at it historically, it is rather ironical that the United States, which has, for
many decades, taken the position that we must protect the traditional freedom of
the high seas, that we must stem the tide of coastal states' unilateralism and expan-
sionism, that we stand for a rule of law which must be the result of universal
consensus, was the first to depart from its own ethical and legal principles. Wit-
tingly or unwittingly, it was the United States which started the historical move-
ment by coastal states to grasp the resources of the sea. I refer to the Presidential
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Proclamation by President Truman on the 28th of September, 1945. By that Proc-
lamation the United States claimed the right to the resources of the continental
shelf, out to the 200 meters isobar. This action on the part of the United States
was soon emulated by a number of coastal states in Latin America who claimed
maritime jurisdictions out to 200 miles.
The second thing the United States did was in 1976. After fighting against the
unilateral claims by the coastal states, in the expediency of an election year in
1976, President Ford signed into law a fisheries conservation zone of 200 miles. I
still remember that on the day that the United States law was enacted, the coastal
states, who were then meeting in New York, had a champagne celebration because
the United States had put the imprimatur of legitimacy on their unilateral claims.
Then in 1980, again in the expediencies of another election year, President
Carter signed into law the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act, authorizing U.S. com-
panies to mine the deep seabed and ocean floor. So I must say, with respect, that
the U.S. record is not a consistent one.
My second point is that you are totally wrong when you said the Soviet Union
and its Warsaw Pact allies have rejected the Convention. That is not true. On the
30th of April the Soviet Bloc countries abstained on the Convention package for
only one reason. In Resolution II of the Conference, which protects the interests of
the pioneer investors, we require that until the Soviet Union signs the Convention,
the Soviet Union cannot be registered as a pioneer investor. However, in the case
of your four western consortia, which are unincorporated and which consist of
partners from different countries, the signature of the Convention by one, any one
of the countries whose companies form the consortia, would enable the consortium
to register as a pioneer investor. And this the Soviet Union could not accept
because they said this was a case of discrimination in favor of the West and against
the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Gromyko, speaking before the U.N. General
Assembly in September, announced that the Soviet Union will sign the Conven-
tion in Jamaica. Other members of the East European group are likely to follow
the Soviet Union, so you may assume that they will all sign the Convention.
MR. BRiTrIN: I am Burdick Brittin from the great community of Great Falls,
Virginia. I have two observations, one to Tommy Koh when he referred to the
impact of sophisticated distant water fisheries creating the climate for what
resulted in an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 miles. I am not about to
turn back the clock, but I would like to note that two factors were also present.
One, the growth of distant water fisheries in the developing countries far out-
stripped what was happening in the developed countries. Secondly, and this is an
unfortunate thing, while 99% of the fish are within the 200-mile zones of the world,
the fact of the matter-the cruel fact-is that those fish are not distributed evenly.
In fact it is so disparate that some places, like off the coast of Kenya, it is practi-
cally an ecological desert. The United States was a wealthy fishing nation to begin
with, and we certainly gained, along with Canada, perhaps more than any other
country in the world. That disparity, i.e., the marked uneven distribution of
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marine resources, is a seed towards the world community looking at the issue again
sometime in the future.
Now a comment to Fred Tipson. In his text he noted that in the 1958 Geneva
Conventions there were no objections here in the United States before the Senate
during the ratification procedure. I think three factors were present to produce
that situation. One is that within the United States I do not believe anyone on the
delegation and in the Senate felt that what was being put together, drafted and to
be ratified, was an immutable instrument that was going to last forever. Contin-
uing technological advances and knowledge of ocean regime history precluded
that line of thought. As a matter of fact, experience shows us that a Law of the Sea
Treaty might last for about twenty or thirty years; then something else has to be
done to meet emerging problems. Yet if you listen to the rhetoric of some of the
mining and administration interests in the United States, you get the sense that we
are putting each word in concrete and that it means eternal devastation for the
United States.
Secondly, and there are others in the room [Professor Horace Robertson, Jr.,
and Vice Adm. Jim Doyle USN, Ret.] who can speak more directly on this than I,
it was my strong impression that the delegations for the United States for the 1958
and 1960 Conferences were closely knit. They represented many different industry
and national interests, but I think it was uniformly appreciated and understood
that the paramount interest of the United States in those negotiations had to do
with national security and that accommodations were made based on that funda-
mental premise. Everybody understood that and respected it.
Lastly, when it came time for ratification, or the attempt for ratification, those
same people from the industries involved lobbied the Senate very, very strongly
indeed, and it is one of the real successes in how to get a treaty through the
required advice and consent of the Senate.
Thank you.
AMBASSADOR KOH: I think the first point made by Bert Brittin is a very good
one, and I am glad you raised it. When the Conference started, some of us in the
Conference wanted to work for a quite different approach to the redistribution of
the resources of the ocean, including fish. I supported strongly the approach advo-
cated by Dr. Pardo for a very strong international oceans authority with extensive
powers. Under this approach, we would regard fish in the high seas as part of the
common heritage of mankind. This was, however, completely unacceptable to the
coastal states and for understandable, though unfortunate, reasons. The coastal
states' response was that, "No, the Pardo approach is not acceptable because we
still live, whether we like it or not, in a era of nation-states." The impulse for
international cooperation is relatively weak compared to the force of nationalism.
The coastal states said that the only tool they would accept to deal with the
problem of fisheries was to extend the power of the coastal states to conserve and
manage the fish stocks of the world.
I agree with our colleague who just made the point that the end result of this
Conference is a rather inequitable one. For example, the Exclusive Economic
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Zones of all the African countries, put together, are smaller than the Exclusive
Economic Zone of the United States alone. Second, the world is really unfair in
that the fish stocks of the world are not equitably distributed. The fish stocks of
the world, like the rich countries, tend to be in the temperate zones, and the richest
fishing grounds are, fortunately for you and unfortunately for the poor countries,
concentrated in the temperate zones.
MR. TIPSON: I think your point is well taken about the security advantages of
the 1958 Conventions. And there are certainly important security advantages in
this Treaty. I think part of the problem has been that we have made it so clear
that we regard security as so important to us and that we felt that the provisions
which had been achieved, while not perfect, were important for our security inter-
ests, that we gave the impression we would be prepared to accept almost anything
else that appeared in the Treaty. I think we misled a great number of countries on
that basis, and the notion that a trade-off was involved was truly accepted, even in
principle, by many people in government. So it really came down to whether the
other provisions of the Treaty would be outweighed by the advantages that we
might gain from a security point of view.
I continue to believe that this Treaty is very helpful on security grounds and
important to us. But those advantages, in my judgment, are not going to override
some of the objections to other parts of the Treaty.
If I might, I would like to offer a counter-anecdote to Tommy [Koh]'s, not
directly in point, but illustrative, I think. When President Carter began his effort
to get the Panama Canal Treaties done, a friend in Congressional Relations said
that their tactic was to bring over to the White House five people who were listed
as leaning against and five people who were listed as leaning for, and these were
generally people who they felt did not understand the issues, and if the President
could really put the case to them on the security advantages of the Panama Canal
Treaties and so on, then these people would come around. So they did. They
brought them over, and Carter sat them down, and he went through an impressive
description of the advantages of the Treaty and so on. These gentlemen went back
and seven out of ten of them voted against the Panama Canal Treaty. Now you
know that was a different treaty, a different situation, but I think to some members
of the Senate there would be enough resistance to this Treaty on certain grounds
that it does not have a chance of getting two-thirds, and as I say, you are hearing
from someone who is generally regarded as a flaky liberal internationalist among
his colleagues in the Senate staff. I do not represent the forces of darkness at all
[laughter] and never have, so if someone like myself has a difficult time recom-
mending in favor of U.S. ratification, I think that is symptomatic of a deeper
problem in the institution.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: I am Jonathan Charney of Vanderbilt University. I have
one comment and one question. We must approach this Convention realistically.
If it were to come into force it would be likely to remain in force for only a limited
period of time. Conventions do not remain in force for hundreds of years. Twenty
or thirty years is the maximum time period that the Convention as it exists today
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might last. I do not think that we should assume that the contents of this Conven-
tion or any Convention that we could draft today would be workable well into the
21st century. It should be understood that the Convention will have to be modi-
fied or replaced to reflect the realities of the future.
My question is really a request for information. I wonder if Ambassador Koh
would identify those countries that are likely to sign the Convention in December.
It would be useful to get an idea of what participation there is likely to be from the
Third World as well as from the developed world.
AMBASSADOR KOH: I do not have a list with me, but according to the Law of the
Sea Secretariat, which has been monitoring announcements by various govern-
ments concerning their intentions, as of a week ago, they informed me they believe
something between 60 to 80 countries will sign the Convention in Jamaica in
December. This will include the Soviet Union, which has announced its intentions
to sign. It will also include France, which has also announced its intention to sign.
My guess is that the Japanese are very likely to announce their intention to sign,
but whether they will do so by December or after, I do not know. The position in
Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany is a touch-and-go situation. I
understand that earlier the British Government had decided in favor of signature,
but they will have to review the position in the light of the position which the
United States government has taken.
Most of the developing countries will sign. I believe that the five Nordic coun-
tries will sign. Some of the medium-sized European countries such as Ireland,
Greece, the Netherlands, Austria, and Canada are likely to sign, and this includes
some members of the European Community. Almost the whole of the Common-
wealth will sign. It is significant that a week ago eighteen heads of government of
Commonwealth countries of the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia and New
Zealand, meeting in Suva, Fiji, adopted a communique which, amongst other
things, endorsed the Convention and called upon states to sign and ratify the Con-
vention. So, I expect Australia and New Zealand to be on board too.
PROFESSOR STEIN: My name is Ted Stein from the University of Washington. I
want to give Ambassador Koh an opportunity to respond to some of the remarks
made by Professor Riesenfeld, and perhaps I can do it by directing you to one
point, but if it is not the one you want to address, you have my proxy.
It seems to me that as a formal matter, grounded in classical international law
doctrine, the United States is really resting on either the view that the navigational
rights under the Convention will be accorded to all states as a matter of customary
international law, or, alternatively, the United States will continue to be entitled
to rely on the preexisting customary international law as a consistent objector to
the new norm which would be applicable to nonstate parties other than consistent
objectors. I wonder if you agree with that analysis as a doctrinal matter, and what
consequences, in political terms, and world order terms, do you see flowing from a
U.S. position based on that doctrinal base?
PROFESSOR RIESENFELD: Before you go off on that heavy stuff you are supposed
AUDIENCE RESPONSE
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
to answer, Mr. Koh, I just want to comment on your little story about "on bal-
ance." Secretary Wirtz used to say that if you have one foot in the deep freezer and
one in the blazing fire, on balance you are comfortable [laughter].
AMBASSADOR KOH: I think the position of the United States will be that those
parts of the Treaty which the United States likes, including the navigational parts,
have either become or will soon become part of customary law. Therefore, all
states, including those not parties to the Convention, may enjoy rights under cus-
tomary law. Whether the coastal states or straits states or archipelagic states will
accept this view or not, I am not sure. I know that in the case of one particular
archipelagic state, one of its representatives has said that the concept of the
archipelagic state has become part of customary international law. But, at the
same time, he denies that the archipelagic sealanes passage, which the Americans
want, is part of customary law. And he has said that if the United States wants to
enjoy the right of archipelagic sealanes passage through its archipelago, it will
have to sign a bilateral agreement with it.
The question raised by Professor Riesenfeld is a difficult question. If you go
through the Convention and try to identify those parts of the Convention which
really codify existing law, those which do not codify existing law but which reflect
emerging customary law, and those parts which one can very confidently say are
conventional law and have no existence in customary law, it is a very difficult
exercise.
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